GOGLIO v. STAR VALLEY RANCH ASSOCIATION
2002 WY 94
48 P.3d 1072
Case Number: 00-256, 00-257
Decided: 06/21/2002
Cite as: 2002 WY 94, 48 P.3d 1072
FRANK GOGLIO, CORA GOGLIO,
KENT HARKER, FRED COBB,
RICHARD ASAY, DOROTHY ASAY,
ALFRED BOSCHETTO, ROBERT
BARNGROVER, JEAN BARNGROVER,
ROBERT CARMINE, WARREN WEBB,
GERALD KITTLESON, and ROY HOLLOWAY,
Appellants (Plaintiffs),
v.
STAR VALLEY RANCH ASSOCIATION,
a Wyoming mutual benefit, non-profit
corporation,
Appellee (Defendant).

Appeal from the District Court of Lincoln County
The Honorable John D. Troughton, Judge
Representing Appellants:
Robert J. Logan of Law Offices of Robert J. Logan, San Jose, CA. Argument by Mr. Logan.
Representing Appellee:
Sean P. Durrant of Palmerlee & Durrant LLC, Buffalo, WY. Argument by Mr. Durrant.
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.
LEHMAN, Chief Justice.

[ś1] Appellant homeowners Goglio et al. (homeowners) are residential lot owners in Star Valley Ranch, a recreational subdivision in Lincoln County, and members of the Star Valley Ranch Association. The consolidated appeal they present to this court is comprised of two cases. In case number 00-256, appellant homeowners sought a declaratory judgment that the culinary water use fee imposed upon them by appellee Star Valley Ranch Association (Association), a non-profit corporation, was a violation of the recorded Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (DCCRs) that govern the relationship between these parties. The district court granted summary judgment for the Association determining that the DCCRs, articles of incorporation, by-laws, and applicable Wyoming statutes authorize the imposition of the fee in question. Having herein determined that the governing documents do not authorize the imposition of such a fee absent an affirmative vote by two-thirds of the members of the Association, we reverse the judgment of the district court.

[ś2] In case no. 00-257, appellant homeowners seek reversal of the district court’s order purportedly granting W.R.C.P. 11 sanctions to appellants. While we agree that the district court’s order is unusual, we construe it essentially as a denial of requested sanctions and, as such, not an abuse of discretion and thus affirm.